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Abstract—We consider a wiretap channel with an eavesdropper
(Eve) and an honest but curious relay (Ray). Ray and the
destination (Bob) are full-duplex (FD) devices. Since we aim at
not revealing information on the secret message to the relay, we
consider the scaled compute-and-forward (SCF) where scaled
lattice coding is used in the transmission by both the source
(Alice) and Bob in order to allow Ray to decode only a linear
combination of the two messages. At the same time Ray transmits
artificial noise (AN) to confuse Eve. When Ray relays the decoded
linear combination, Alice and Bob are transmitting AN against
Eve. This can be a 5G cellular communication scenario where
a mobile terminal (MT) aims at transmitting a secret message
to a FD base station (BS), with the assistance of a network FD
relay. With respect to existing literature the innovations of this
paper are: a) Bob and Ray are FD devices; b) Alice, Ray and
Bob transmit also AN; and c) the channel to Eve is not known to
Alice, Bob and Ray. For this scenario we derive bounds on both
the secrecy outage probability under Rayleigh fading conditions
of the channels to Eve, and the achievable secrecy-outage rates.
Index Terms—Confidentiality; Full-Duplex; Physical layer se-
curity; Relays; Security.
I. INTRODUCTION
The next generation of mobile communication systems (5G)
will most probably encompass various technological innova-
tions, including among others, full-duplex (FD) devices [1] and
multi-hop (relayed) transmissions. It has also been advocated
[2] that security should be extended at the physical layer using,
as a complement to traditional computational security, physical
layer security (PLS) approaches.
In this paper we focus on PLS solutions for a relay-assisted
communication, where both the relay and the destination are
FD devices. It has already been shown the advantage of
cooperation (relaying) for physical layer security [3], which
motivates the focus on this approach. This scenario arises for
example in a cellular 5G system, where a mobile terminal
(MT) aims at transmitting a secret message to a FD base
station (BS), with the assistance of a network FD relay. This
scenario has been considered in the literature: for example,
for FD relay see [4], [5] and references therein. In [6] an un-
authenticated relay was considered (to be kept in the darkness
of the secret message), and the destination sent artificial noise
(AN) during the source’s transmission, and both an upper
bound on the secret rate and achievable rates were derived.
When the relay is secure, linear precoding schemes can be
applied on a decode and forward (DF) transmission with
AN [7]. amplify and forward (AF) relaying and simultaneous
jamming by other nodes has been considered in [8] where
selection of relay and jamming nodes has been addressed.
The case of FD destination without relaying is considered
in [9] in the absence of channel-state information (CSI) on
the eavesdropper channel, and in [10] under various CSI
assumptions on the legitimate and eavesdropper channels.
The case of a communication between single-antenna devices
assisted by a multi-antenna FD relay is considered in [11],
where joint information and jamming beamforming are de-
signed to guarantee secrecy. A DF solution for FD relaying
is also considered in [12] showing the advantages of FD over
half-duplex (HD) network solutions. The multi-source multi-
relay scenario has been considered in various papers (see
[13] and references therein), with and without AF/DF and
various knowledge of the CSI of the eavesdropper channel,
and selection of sources and relays have been optimized. In
[14] a modulo-and-forward is considered for a single relay
without eavesdropper, and in the case of no CSI the outage
probability is derived. In [15] a scaled compute-and-forward
(SCF) was introduced, and the presence of an eavesdropper
was also considered. However the source and destination nodes
perfectly know the CSI to the eavesdropper, which is not
always a realistic assumption.
In this paper we consider that both Ray and Bob are FD.
Since we aim at not revealing information on the secret mes-
sage to the relay, we consider the SCF. At the same time Ray
transmits AN to confuse Eve. When Ray relays the decoded
linear combination, Alice and Bob are transmitting AN against
Eve. With respect to existing literature the innovations of this
paper are: a) Bob and Ray are FD devices; b) Alice, Ray and
Bob transmit also AN; and c) the channel to Eve is not known
to Alice, Bob and Ray. For this scenario we derive a bound
on the secrecy outage probability. In particular, for the case of
Rayleigh fading conditions of the channels to Eve, we derive a
close form expression of the secrecy outage probability bound.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a relay network with a device (Alice) willing
to convey a message to another device (Bob), with the help
of a relay (Ray). The message must remain secret to a
potential passive eavesdropper (Eve), whose location (and even
existence) is unknown to both Alice and Bob. Ray is always
honest, thus he complies with the transmission protocol rules
and aims at supporting Alice and Bob at best. However, he
is curious, i.e., willing to know the secret message: thus the
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Figure 1. Transmissions in the two phases of the proposed scheme among
Alice (A), Bob (B), Ray (R) and Eve (E). Solid lines represent transmission
of messages, while dashed lines represent AN transmissions.
communication protocol ensures that the message remains
secret also to him. In any case, Eve and Ray are not colluding
to get information on the secret message.
Both Alice and Eve1 are assumed to be HD devices, while
both Bob and Ray have FD capabilities. All users are equipped
with a single antenna. The devices have a maximum unitary
transmit power, and we assume that each receiver is subject
to a zero-mean unitary-power additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN). Extension to the case of devices equipped with
multiple antennas is left for future study.
We assume that there is no direct link between Alice and
Bob, therefore the support of Ray is needed. Among antennas
we have flat, reciprocal and AWGN channels. So that the
complex channel between users are for the Alice/Bob-Ray
channel Gx with x = A or B, and for Alice/Bob/Ray-Eve
channel Qx with x = A or B or R. Since we assume that
the relay is curious but honest, we assume that he let Alice
and Bob perfectly know the correct channel gains. On the
other hand, Eve is not honest and we only assume to know
the statistics of its channel to both Alice and Bob.
III. SECURE COMMUNICATION PROTOCOLS
The communication protocol is based on SCF. Starting from
a lattice Λ, we construct two lattices ΛA,ΛB ⊂ Λ, having
unitary second moment, being good in both quantizing and
shaping sense of [16]. Let VA and VB be the fundamental
Voronoi region of ΛA and ΛB, respectively. Let also a1, a2 ∈
Z, and βA, βB ∈ R+.
The protocol comprises two phases, whose transmission
activities are reported in Fig. 1. Solid lines represent
transmission of messages, while dashed lines represent
transmissions of AN. In both phases Eve listens to ongoing
transmissions. The other devices operate as follows.
First phase:
• Alice encodes message MA of rate RS by applying the
random binning approach of [15] and selecting a lattice
vector SA ∈ Λ ∩ VA. Then she transmits the lattice
vector XA = [SA/βA+DA] (mod ΛA/βA), where DA
is dither uniformly chosen from the scaled Voronoi region
1Since we are considering Eve as a passive eavesdropper, nothing changes
if we assume that she is FD.
VA/βA. Let R0 be the random signal rate and
RA = R0 +RS (1)
the rate of SA.
• Bob encodes a random message with rate RB V B ∈
Λ∩VB chosen uniformly at random, and the transmitted
vector is XB = [V B/βB + DB] (mod ΛB/βB), where
DB is dither uniformly chosen from the scaled Voronoi
region VB/βB.
• Ray is receiving the signal from Alice and Bob and at
the same time is transmitting zero-mean Gaussian AN.
Second phase:
• Alice transmits AN.
• Ray decodes
U = a1S
A + a2V
B (2)
(conditions for successful decoding will be discussed
in the following section), and computes U˜ = U/a1
(mod ΛA). Then he encodes U˜ with a secrecy capac-
ity achieving code using a random message with rate
RR, and transmits the encoded message XR with rate
RR +RA.
• Bob receives the message from Ray, and at the same time
transmits zero-mean Gaussian AN.
We want Bob to decode the secret message at the end
of the two phases, by letting at the same time Ray and
Eve in the darkness of the secret message. The purpose of
transmissions of message MB and ANs is to obtain secrecy.
Ray, beyond operating according to the protocol, will also try
to get information on the secret message. Note that the AN
generated by Alice in the second phase does not affect Bob,
since Bob does not receive signals from Alice.
This protocol is a generalization of the protocol described
in [15] for the following reasons: a) Bob and Ray are FD
devices; b) Alice, Ray and Bob transmit also AN; and c) the
channel to Eve is not known to Alice, Bob and Ray.
In the following we assume that the achievable rate of the
resulting Ray-Bob channel is higher than that of the Alice-Ray
channel, in the absence of Bob transmissions2.
A. Decodability Conditions
We first consider here the conditions on the various param-
eters (a1, a2, βA and βB) and rates (RA and RB) that ensure
decodability of the secret message SA at Bob. Let
δA = |GA|2 , δB = |GB|2 , (3)
be the signal to noise ratios (SNRs) of the Alice-Ray and
Bob-Ray channel, respectively.
For decodability with vanishing error probability at Ray of
U with infinite codeword length we must have [15]
RA ≤ log2
(
β2AδA
MN
)
, RB ≤ log2
(
β2BδB
MN
)
(4)
2Generalization to any ratio of power is possible, with more elaborate
expressions.
where
MN =
δAδB(a1βA − a2βB)2 + (a1βA)2δ2A + (a2βB)2δB
δA + δB + 1
.
(5)
For decodability of the secret message sent by Ray in the
second phase we must ensure
log2(1 + δ
2
B) ≥ RR +RA . (6)
IV. ACHIEVABLE SECRECY RATE
We now consider the secrecy conditions for the proposed
protocol. We will first consider the case without Eve, where
we only want to let Ray not to get any information on MA,
and then consider the case in which Eve is also present and
we want to let her too in the darkness of the secret message.
A. Achievable Secrecy Rate Without Eve
We assume now that Eve is not present. Then, the protocol
must ensures perfect secrecy only with respect to Ray.
The resulting system corresponds to the scenario of [15] for
which the achievable secrecy rate is bounded as
RS ≤ log2
1 + δA + δB
[
√
(1 + δA)(1 + δB)−
√
δAδB]2
− 2 , (7)
with the maximum achieved with a1 = a2 = 1 and
β1
β2
=
√
δB(1 + δA)
δA(1 + δB)
. (8)
B. Achievable Secrecy Rate With Eve
Since here we assume that legitimate users only have a
statistical description of the channel to Eve, we cannot employ
the approach of [15] that imposed that a linear combination of
messages MA andMB was also decodable by Eve. Moreover,
we should also take into account the fact that Eve receives the
message sent by Ray.
About Eve, we only aim at preventing her from getting
information on the secret message, not caring if she decode
some liner combination of MA and MB . Therefore two
actions will be taken:
• in the first phase Ray transmits AN that will lower the
decoding capabilities of Eve, and
• in the second phase Ray encodes with a random binning
approach his message.
These two actions will not be enough to guarantee that Eve
does not get any information on the secret message. There
will be in any case an outage event, i.e., the event in which
Eve gets some information on MA. We can upper-bound this
outage probability by computing the probability that either Eve
is able to get some information from either the first phase or
the second phase. Let Oi be the outage event in phase i = 1, 2.
We will derive a superset of the outage event in the first phase,
i.e., O1 ⊆ O¯1, and we will upper-bound the outage probability
as
Pout = 1− P[OC1 ,OC2 ] ≤ 1− P[(O¯1)C ,OC2 ] , (9)
where AC represents the complementary event to event A.
Remark: We will ensure that in the second phase Eve
does not get information on both MA and MB, since a
leakage on MB could help her in extracting information on
MA from what she received in the first phase.
Remark: We still need to ensure that Ray does not get
any information on the secret message, hence (7) must still
hold.
We now detail the actions and the corresponding secrecy
outage probabilities.
First Phase: Let Y E be the signal received by Eve in the
first phase. The information leakage rate on MA to Eve is
RL =
1
N
I(MA;Y E)
=
1
N
[
H(MA)−H(XA, XB|Y E)
−H(MA|Y E , XA, XB) +H(XA, XB|Y E ,MA)
]
=
1
N
[
H(MA)−H(XA, XB) + I(XA, XB;Y E)
+H( XB)− I(XB;Y E′)
]
(10)
where H(·) and I(·; ·) are the entropy and the mutual in-
formation, and in the second line we observe that if Eve
knows MA she can subtract XA from Y E (to obtain Y E′ ),
and H(XA, XB|Y E ,MA) = H(XB|Y E) (since by knowing
MA she also knows XA). We thus obtain the upper bound
RL <
1
N
[
I(XA, XB;Y E)− I(XB;Y E′)
]
. (11)
Now, from the definition of the capacity of the multi-
ple access channel (MAC) from Alice and Bob to Eve
CMAC(X
A, XB;Y E) (considering also the AN transmitted
by Ray) we have
RL < CMAC(X
A, XB;Y E)− 1
N
I(XB;Y E
′
) . (12)
Unfortunately, it is hard to to lower bound I(XB;Y E′). We
can consider two cases, either Eve is able to decode MB from
Y E
′
, or not. Considering the lattice coding, from [17] the
first case occurs if RB ≤ C(XB;Y E′) where C(XB;Y E′) =
max I(XB;Y E
′
) and we have
RL ≤ CMAC(XA, XB;Y E)−RB . (13)
On the other hand, if Eve is not able to decode MB we can
only upper bound RL as follows
RL ≤ CMAC(XA, XB;Y E) . (14)
Since Alice applies random binning, a subset (O¯1)C ⊂ O¯C1
of the non secrecy-outage event is given by
(O¯1)C = S1 ∪ S2 =
{CMAC(XA, XB;Y E)−RB ≤ R0,
C(XB;Y E
′
) ≥ RB}∪
{CMAC(XA, XB;Y E) ≤ R0, C(XB;Y E
′
) ≤ RB} .
(15)
Therefore (9) becomes
Pout ≤ 1− (P[S1,OC2 ] + P[S2,OC2 ]) . (16)
Second Phase: In the second phase we aim at preventing
Eve from getting any information on both MA and MB.
Alice and Bob transmit AN and Ray will employ random
binning. Note that we cannot utilize the randomness of the first
phase for secrecy purposes, since Eve may have decoded the
randomness of the first phase (while not being able of getting
any information on the secret message) and can exploit this
knowledge in the second phase. This is why we need a second
random binning process. Therefore we have a secrecy outage
event when
C(XR; Y¯ ) ≥ RR , (17)
where Y¯ is the signal received by Eve in the second phase.
C. Rayleigh Fading Scenario
We now derive the close form expression of the secrecy
outage probability bound for the case in which all links with
Eve are characterized by Rayleigh fading. In particular, let
1/λA, 1/λB, and 1/λR be the average SNR of the links
between Eve and Alice, Bob and Ray, respectively.
Denoting the scalars qA = |QA|2, qB = |QB|2, qR = |QR|2,
we have CMAC(XA, XB;Y E) = log2
(
1 + qA+qB
1+qR
)
and
S1 =
{
log2
(
1 +
qA + qB
1 + qR
)
≤ R0 +RB,
log2
(
1 +
qB
1 + qR
)
≥ RB
}
=
{qA + qB ≤ µ(1 + qR), qB ≥ ν(1 + qR)},
(18)
with µ = 2R0+RB − 1 and ν = 2RB − 1, and analogously
S2 ={qA + qB − µ′qR ≤ µ′, qB − νqR ≤ ν}
=
{
qR ≥ max
(
qA + qB − µ′
µ′
;
qB − ν
ν
)}
,
(19)
with µ′ = 2R0 − 1.
For the second phase we have C(XR; Y¯ ) =
log2
(
1 + qR
1+qA+qB
)
, and
OC2 =
{
log2
(
1 +
qR
1 + qA + qB
)
≤ RR
}
=
{qR − φ(qA + qB) ≤ φ}{
qA + qB ≥ qR
φ
− 1
}
,
(20)
with φ = 2RR − 1. Hence we have
P[OC1 ,OC2 ] = P[S1,OC2 ] + P[S2,OC2 ] . (21)
We observe that S1OC2 6= ∅ if
qR
φ
− 1 ≤ µqR + µ , (22)
which always occurs if µφ ≥ 1, while it requires
qR ≤ φ+ µφ
1− µφ = γ if µφ < 1 . (23)
Moreover, condition OC2 has no effect if
qR
φ
− 1 ≤ νqR + ν , (24)
which always occurs if νφ ≥ 1, and which occurs when
qR ≤ φ+ νφ
1− φν = δ, if νφ < 1 . (25)
Considering the definition of
Z(A,B,C,D,C ′, D′, E, F, F ) in (26)-(36) reported in
the next page, Therefore we have the following cases
1) Case µφ ≥ 1 and φν < 1.
This will lead to P[S1,OC2 ] =
Z(0, δ, µ, µ, ν, ν, 0, µ) + Z(δ,∞, 1/φ,−1, ν, ν, 1, µ) +
Z(δ,∞, µ, µ, 1/φ,−1, 0, µ).
2) Case µφ ≥ 1 and φν ≥ 1. This will lead to
P[S1,OC2 ] = Z(0,∞, µ, µ, ν, ν, 0, µ).
3) Case µφ < 1. This will imply φν < 1 and
will lead to P[S1,OC2 ] = Z(0, δ, µ, µ, ν, ν, 0, µ) +
Z(δ, γ, 1/φ,−1, ν, ν, 1, µ)+Z(δ, γ, µ, µ, 1/φ,−1, 0, µ).
We observe that S2OC2 6= ∅ if either µ′φ ≥ 1 and νφ ≥ 1,
or µ′φ < 1, νφ ≥ 1 and
qR ≤ φ+ µ
′φ
1− µ′φ = γ
′ , (37)
or µ′φ ≥ 1, νφ < 1 and qR ≤ δ, or µ′φ < 1, νφ < 1 and
qR ≤ min{δ, γ′}.
Moreover, condition OC2 has no effect if qR < φ. Lastly, if
µ′ ≤ ν, S2 reduces to S2 = {qA + qB − µ′qR ≤ µ} (the other
bound has no effect). Therefore we have the following cases
1) Case µ′φ ≥ 1, µ′ > ν and φν ≥
1. This will lead to P[S2,OC2 ] =
Z(0, φ, ν, ν, 0, 0, 0, µ′) +Z(φ,∞, 1/φ,−1, 0, 0, 1, µ′) +
Z(φ,∞, ν, ν, 1/φ,−1, 0, µ′).
2) Case µ′φ ≥ 1, µ′ > ν and φν <
1. This will lead to P[S2,OC2 ] =
Z(0, φ, ν, ν, 0, 0, 0, µ′) + Z(φ, δ, 1/φ,−1, 0, 0, 1, µ′) +
Z(φ, δ, ν, ν, 1/φ,−1, 0, µ′).
3) Case µ′φ ≥ 1 and µ′ ≤ ν. This will lead
to P[S2,OC2 ] = Z(0, φ, µ′, µ′, 0, 0, 0, µ′) +
Z(φ,∞, 1/φ,−1, 0, 0, 1, µ′) +
Z(φ,∞, µ′, µ′, 1/φ,−1, 0, µ′).
4) Case µ′φ < 1 and µ′ > ν. This will
lead to P[S2,OC2 ] = Z(0, φ, ν, ν, 0, 0, 0, µ′) +
Z(φ,min{γ′, δ}, 1/φ,−1, 0, 0, 1, µ′) +
Z(φ,min{γ′, δ}, ν, ν, 1/φ,−1, 0, µ′).
5) Case µ′φ < 1 and µ′ ≤ ν. This will lead
to P[S2,OC2 ] = Z(0, φ, µ′, µ′, 0, 0, 0, µ′) +
Z(φ, γ′, 1/φ,−1, 0, 0, 1, µ′) +
Z(φ, γ′, µ′, µ′, 1/φ,−1, 0, µ′).
Z(A,B,C,D, C′, D′, E, F ) = λAλBλR
∫ B
qR=A
∫ CqR+C′
qB=DqR+D
′
∫ FqR+F−qB
qA=E(qR/φ−1−qB)
e−λBqBe−λAqAe−λRqRdqAdqBdqR =
− λBλR
∫ B
qR=A
e−λRqR
∫ CqR+C′
qB=DqR+D
′
e−λBqB
[
e−λA[FqR+F−qB] − e−λAE(qR/φ−1−qB)
]
dqBdqR
(26)
Zx,1(A,B,C,D, C
′, D′, E, F ) =
λBλRe
−λAF
λA − λB
{
e(λA−λB)x
′
(λA − λB)x− λR − λAF
[
e((λA−λB)x−λR−λAF )B − e((λA−λB)x−λR−λAF )A
]}
(27)
Xx,1(A,B,C,D, C
′, D′, E, F ) =
λBλRe
λAE
λAE − λB
{
e(λAE−λB)x
′
(λAE − λB)x− λR −
λAE
φ
[
e
((λAE−λB)x−λR−
λAE
φ
)B
− e
((λAE−λB)x−λR−
λAE
φ
)A
]}
(28)
Z2(A,B,C,D, C
′, D′, E, F ) =
λBλRe
−λAF (C −D)
−(λR + λAF )2
{e−(λR+λAF )B [(λR + λAF )(B +
C′ −D′
C −D
) + 1]
−e−(λR+λAF )A[(λR + λAF )(A+
C′ −D′
C −D
) + 1]}
(29)
X2(A,B,C,D,E, F ) =
λBλRe
λAE(C −D)
−(λR + λAE/φ)2
{e−(λR+λAE/φ)B[(λR + λAE/φ)(B +
C′ −D′
C −D
) + 1]−
e−(λR+λAE/φ)A[(λR + λAE/φ)(A+
C′ −D′
C −D
) + 1]}
(30)
Zx,2(A,B,C,D, C
′, D′, E,F ) =
λBλRe
−λAF e(λA−λB)x
λA − λB
(B−A) , Xx,2(A,B,C,D,C
′, D′, E, F ) =
λBλRe
λAEe(λAE−λB)x
λAE − λB
(B−A) ,
(31)
Zx(A,B,C,D, C
′, D′, E, F ) =
{
Zx,1(A,B,C,D,C
′, D′, E, F ) if (λA − λB)x− λR − λAF 6= 0
Zx,2(A,B,C,D,C
′, D′, E, F ) if (λA − λB)x− λR − λAF = 0
, x = C,D (32)
Xx(A,B,C,D, C
′, D′, E, F ) =
{
Xx,1(A,B,C,D,C
′, D′, E, F ) if (λAE − λB)x− λR − λAEφ 6= 0
Xx,2(A,B,C,D,C
′, D′, E, F ) if (λAE − λB)x− λR − λAEφ = 0
, x = C,D (33)
T1(A,B,C,D, E, F ) =
{
ZC(A,B,C,D,C
′, D′, E, F )− ZD(A,B,C,D,C
′, D′, E, F ) if λA − λB 6= 0 ,
Z2(A,B,C,D,C
′, D′, E, F ) if λA − λB = 0
(34)
T2(A,B,C,D, C
′, D′, E, F ) =
{
XC(A,B,C,D,C
′, D′, E, F )−XD(A,B,C,D,C
′, D′, E, F ) if λAE − λB 6= 0 ,
X2(A,B,C,D,C
′, D′, E, F ) if λAE − λB = 0
(35)
Z(A,B,C,D, C′, D′, E, F ) = T2(A,B,C,D, C
′, D′, E,F )− T1(A,B,C,D,C
′, D′, E, F ) . (36)
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In order to show an example of performance of the consid-
ered system, we consider δA = 20 dB, δB = 10 dB. We first
have spanned the value of βA/βB and found the achievable
region of (RA, RB) couples, as shown in Fig. 2.
Then we set λA = λR = 1, and λB = 2, and RS =
0.1 bit/s/Hz, and RR = 7 bit/s/Hz. Fig. 3 shows the bound on
the secrecy outage probability (in a log scale) as a function of
RA and RB. Note that we have only shown the values of P¯out
in correspondence of valid couples RA and RB that ensure the
decodability conditions for the secret message at Bob, while
not leaking any information to Ray. We also identify the couple
(RA, RB) providing the minimum P¯out, which is about 10−5.
In general, we observe that increasing RA reduces the
chances of leaking information to Eve in the first phase
(since we can increase R0). On the other hand, since Ray
transmits the secret message at rate RA, we potentially have
an information leakage in the second phase since the rate of
the random message RR −RA is decreased.
Fig. 4 shows the secrecy probability outage bound P¯out vs
RS for three values of RR. RA and RB have been optimized
to minimize P¯out. We observe that as RS increases, the outage
bound increases too, since the random message rates R0 and
(RR − RA) in the two phases are reduced. Also, increasing
RR provides a lower P¯out since it allows to better protect the
second phase, increasing the random message rate.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have considered a secure communication scenario where
a secret message must be kept unknown both to a curious but
honest device that relays the message to the destination, and
to an eavesdropper. While the channel to the relay is known
to the legitimate devices, the channel to the eavesdropper
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Figure 2. Achievable region of (RA, RB) couples.
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Figure 3. Contour plot of log10 P¯out as a function of RA and RB. Only
values of RA and RB allows decodability conditions at Bob and secrecy at
Ray are considered. The couple of (RA, RB) providing the minimum value
of P¯out is shown with a cross.
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Figure 4. Secrecy probability outage bound P¯out vs RS for three values of
RR. RA and RB have been optimized to minimize P¯out.
is not known, hence a secrecy outage event is possible.
Considering FD devices and letting Ray transmit AN, we
have described the protocol that mixes a SCF approach and a
random binning approach to provide secrecy. Then the secrecy
outage probability for a Rayleigh fading scenario has been
computed in a close form. Lastly, some numerical results have
provided an insight into the main features of the considered
system.
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